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Abstract—In order to detect malicious insider attacks it is
important to model and analyse infrastructures and policies
of organisations and the insiders acting within them. We ex-
tend formal approaches that allow modelling such scenarios
by quantitative aspects to enable a precise analysis of security
designs. Our framework enables evaluating the risks of an insider
attack to happen quantitatively. The framework first identifies an
insider’s intention to perform an inside attack, using Bayesian
networks, and in a second phase computes the probability of
success for an inside attack by this actor, using probabilistic
model checking. We provide prototype tool support using Matlab
for Bayesian networks and PRISM for the analysis of Markov
decision processes, and validate the framework with case studies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer security has always been considered as a cross-
cutting problem domain. Today, the real security risks are
largely based on the attacker being someone within the orga-
nisation; security has to emphasize the top-layer, the organi-
sational part of security. This organisation cannot be reduced
to individual interactions between human and computers, but
must be viewed from a more global perspective in which
“organisation” refers to the infrastructure of a company or
other segments of societal life in which humans and physical
devices interact.
While attack vectors can be identified through invalidation
of policies [4], a quantitative analysis is still missing. More-
over, it is crucial that a security analyst in an organisation has
tools that enable a concrete estimation of insider risk given an
infrastructure, the actors and their profiles. We thus propose
in this paper a quantitative framework for the estimation of
malicious insider risk that uses probabilities as well as budgets
of actors for insider threat analysis.
This is an extended abstract of the paper [3] with the same
title, which provides more details on the preliminaries, analysis
framework, as well as examples.
II. AN ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK
The overall aim of the analysis is to estimate the probability
that an employee of an organisation (conceived as the in-
sider) launches a successful insider attack. Generally speaking,
our framework consists of two components: The intentional
analysis provides a quantitative measure for the risk that a
particular employee may reach the tipping point and turn into
a malicious insider; the behavioural analysis estimates where
an insider could successfully launch an attack in a company’s
infrastructure. This is influenced by the personal characteristics
of the attacker, for example, the attacker’s skill to break a lock
or succeed in social engineering the secretary. We elaborate
the model-based techniques we propose for the two parts of
analysis as follows.
A. Intentional Analysis
Insider threats are usually specified by System Dynamics [2].
Our analysis involves enriching the System Dynamics model
by quantitative information, i.e., the (conditional) probabili-
ties, giving rise to a Bayesian network. The graph structure of
the Bayesian network conforms to the given System Dynamics
model. Technically, for each node in the System Dynamics
model, we introduce a random variable. In general, we usually
have the following two cases:
1) For events that might happen, the corresponding random
variable is governed by the Bernoulli distribution, i.e., it
takes value 1 with success probability p and value 0 with
failure probability q = 1− p;
2) For quantities of continuous nature, in principle we
can introduce a continuous random variable, e.g., the
degree of dissatisfaction, ranging over [0, 1]. However, for
computational efficiency, we usually discretise [0, 1] into
partitions [0, 0.1), [0.1, 0.2), · · · , or even coarser gran-
ularity, such as “low”, “mediate”, “high”, which could
correspond to [0, 0.3), [0.3, 0.7), [0.7, 1], respectively.
As the next step, we need to specify the conditional proba-
bilities appearing in the Bayesian network, which can be learnt
from historical data by standard machine learning techniques.
a) Implementation: We provide a preliminary implemen-
tation of the intention analysis framework, by leveraging the
Bayes Net Toolbox ([7], BNT), a tool for Bayesian network
that is an open-source Matlab package for directed graphical
models. It supports many kinds of nodes (probability dis-
tributions), exact and approximate inference, parameter and
structure learning, and static and dynamic models.
We encode our Bayesian network in Matlab in a straight-
forward way: the directed acyclic graph (given in the System
Dynamics model) is specified as an adjacency matrix and the
conditional probabilities are specified by the “CP” constructor
provided by BNT.
With the Bayesian network model, one can carry out various
analyses, which are typically done by probabilistic inference.
Below we exemplify two queries by performing exact in-
ference and using only the standard junction tree algorithm
(supported by the junction tree engine in BNT).
A typical likelihood query for the BN such as
Pr[Steal = H | Den = 1 and Event = 1]
can be done by computing joint distributions. Intuitively, this
is to compute the probability that the insider’s desire to steal
is high (Steal = H) on the condition that the organisation
denies the insider’s request (Den = 1) and there is a competitor
enticing the insider (Event = 1). This serves our basic purpose
of the intentional analysis.
We can also perform an a posteriori query that computes
the probability of a precipitating event given that the insider’s
desire to steal is high, e.g., Pr[Event = 1 | Steal = H]. This
is done by computing marginal distributions. Such an analysis
is useful as the analyst can identify the main factors which
lead to the insider attack.
B. Behavioural analysis
The second component of our framework is the behavioural
analysis of insider threats. Given the infrastructure of the
organisation and a personal profile, this analysis estimates
the probability of successful insider attacks. This part of the
analysis has four steps:
• Step 1: Model the infrastructure in the abstract system
specification.
• Step 2: Encode the abstract system specification in Ex-
ASyM and generate the labelled transition system.
The transformation performs a reachability analysis to
generate the set of valid configurations and transitions.
The analysis visits all locations where an actor might
be, performs all actions that the actor does not need
another data item for, and generates states and transitions
accordingly. If a new data item has been obtained or a
new location has been reached, the algorithm performs all
actions that the new capability enables. This computation
is repeated until a fix point is reached.
• Step 3: Translate the transition system into Markov
decision processes (MDP) by annotating the transitions
with probabilities.
An MDP for the system can be found in Fig. 1. For the
probabilities, we mainly consider: (1) entering proba-
bility, which, for each state (being physical or logical),
specifies the probability for an actor (insider) to access
that location by any means. (2) successful probability,
which, for each terminal state, specifies the probability
that an actor manages to accomplish the attack after
entering the terminal location. (3) detecting probability,
which, for each state, specifies the probability of being
caught when the insider attempts to perform the attack.
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Fig. 1. MDP model of the example
We use the probabilistic model checker PRISM [5] to
specify the MDP.
• Step 4: Perform behavioural analysis by verification and
synthesis of the Markov decision process.
Now we analyse the obtained MDP by standard proba-
bilistic model checking techniques to compute the maxi-
mum probability that the insider steals a confidential file
without being caught. Note that the insider has different
strategies, for instance, selecting where to go from a
physical location, or trying to social engineer other actors.
The insider’s goal is to maximise success probability,
whereas the organisation must consider a worst-case
scenario.
Such a problem boils down to computing the maximum
probability to reach the state (succ,X) (state (6,X) in
the running example). For this purpose, we consider
the query Pmax=?[F (loc=succ and tick=1)]
where PRISM returns the maximum probability, as well
as the corresponding strategy for the insider to achieve
this probability.
By such an analysis, the organisation can identify the
potential weakness of the infrastructure, and carry out
necessary security improvement.
C. Budget Analysis
The behaviour analysis focuses exclusively on analysing the
best strategy of an insider to maximise the chance of success.
A tacit assumption is that the insider is determined to launch
the insider attack at all costs. However, in practice, typically
each (insider) action comes with a cost, in terms of money,
time, or computation power. The cost of attacks is an important
factor when selecting the strategy to launch the attack, or to
decide whether such an attack pays off.
Therefore, a refined analysis – budget analysis – should
take the limited resource of insiders into account. One typical
scenario is that the insider has a certain budget to launch the
attack. Intuitively, the budget captures the capital the insider
can afford or is willing to pay. Under these limited resources,
we intend to identify the maximum probability of success by
exploiting MDP models with costs/prices. In other words, each
state is equipped with a nonnegative real number (in practice,
usually an integral), which intuitively characterises the cost of
passing the state.
Note that our budget analysis is an open framework within
which an analyst could study various behaviour of insiders.
To make this framework concrete, we give some examples of
interesting analysis questions:
1) What is the maximum expected “cost” of
the insider to launch an attack, e.g., eg
R"cost"min=?[F (loc=succ and tick=1)].?
For this type of budget analysis, we shall use real-valued
reachability reward query, which associates a cost with
each path of the MDP. More specifically, they refer to
the reward accumulated along a path until a certain point
is reached.
2) Given the budget which the insider is willing to
(or is able to) pay, what is the maximal success
probability and the associated optimal strategy, e.g.,
Pmax=? [F <=x (loc=succ and tick=1) ].?
For this type of question, it is assumed that the insider
has a prescribed budget x, and the analyst is interested
in computing the maximal success probability and the
associated optimal strategy.
3) What is the strategy the insider might take under which
a certain profit is guaranteed and the expected “cost” is
affordable?
To cope with such a question, we need a multi-objective
query. First of all, apart from the rewards structure “cost”
defined before, we introduce another rewards structure
profit which specifies the gain of the insider. For instance,
rewards "profit"
loc=6 & tick=1 : 2000;
loc=4 & tick=1 : 1500;
...
endrewards
We then can query PRISM to compute approximately the
Pareto curve for this pair of objectives.
multi(R{"cost"}min=?[F loc=succ and tick=1],
R{"profit"} max= [F loc=succ and tick=1])
We briefly discuss why these questions trigger a more thor-
ough analysis. For the first question, common sense shows a
rational insider will not choose an attack where the expected
cost exceeds some threshold. Hence, the organisation might
not worry too much about such strategies as insiders are
unlikely to follow them. For the second question, the analyst
can estimate the risk and find the potential strategy of an
insider for a given budget. For the third question, we postulate
that the insider wants to maximise the profit by launching an
insider attack while keeping the expected cost below a certain
level. Such strategies should be the focus of the analyst and
should be prevented by the organisation.
III. CONCLUSION
We have provided a quantitative analysis that enables se-
curity analysts to estimate the concrete insider risk given an
infrastructure, the actors and their profiles. The framework
identifies insiders’ intention to attack using Bayesian networks
followed by computing the probability of success for this actor
with probabilistic model checking. It has been supported by
Matlab and PRISM in the two steps respectively.
b) Related Work: We base our work on existing tax-
onomies of insiders [10], [2]. [4] uses Higher Order Logic to
model insider threats enabling a possibilistic analysis without
quantitatively estimating the risk of an insider attack. The
Insider threat patterns provided by CERT [2] use System
Dynamics models, but do not support probabilities quantifying
these dependencies nor any of the probabilistic analysis that
we propose here. Axelrad et al. [1] have used Bayesian
networks for modelling insider threats, but did not provide
analysis or implementation. [8] presents a methodology for
insider threats assessment and mitigation. Bearing similar
aims, the approaches are quite different: [8] is largely based on
the ADVISE method [6]. The models therein lack probabilis-
tic/cost aspects, and the analysis is based on simulation while
our method is based on model checking. Very recently, [9]
outlines a research proposal for studying security with “human
in the loop”.
For the future work, we are currently building up a tool
chain which integrates different analysis presented in the
paper into a monolithic tool. Moreover, the current framework
considers MDPs. An interesting view is to treat the company
and (potentially multiple) insiders as players of a game,
which would allow analysing, for example, coalition (as the
ambitious leader example shows) of insiders.
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